We de…ne and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more expansionary policy than a high-credibility bank, in the sense that it induces higher in ‡ation, but a less expansionary policy in the sense that it induces lower in ‡ation and employment than expected. Increased transparency makes the bank's reputation and credibility more sensitive to its actions. This moderates the bank's policy, and induces the bank to follow a policy closer to the socially optimal one. Full transparency of the central bank's intentions is generally socially bene…cial, but frequently not in the interest of the bank. Somewhat paradoxically, direct observability of idiosyncratic central bank goals removes the moderating in ‡uence on the bank and leads to the worst equilibrium.
Introduction
In December 1989, as U.S. in ‡ation was cresting 5 percent for the …rst time in 6 years, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) held discussions regarding whether the Fed should more …rmly pursue "price stability." 1 The FOMC chose not to pursue its zealously-held goal at that time.
Credibility and transparency are now centerpieces of policy discussions by both academics and policymakers. This paradigm-…rst codi…ed by Kydland and Prescott [26] and Barro and Gordon [6] -rose to favor because it o¤ered an account of why industrialized countries chose such high in ‡ation rates from the 1960s through the early 1980s and o¤ered important predictions about the economics of reducing in ‡ation in these economies and in economies facing hyperin ‡ations. This literature has made great strides in these areas.
While a number of countries have now returned to extended periods of relatively low in ‡ation-below, say, …ve percent-the issues of credibility and transparency that came to the fore during high in ‡ation remain prominent. Credibility was clearly viewed to be of central importance by the FOMC in December 1989 after the 6 years of low U.S. in ‡ation, and as documented by Blinder [4] , such issues have not faded after a further decade of low in ‡ation. Several authors have recently argued that there would be signi…cant bene…ts to the U.S. and other countries from adopting a more transparent policy such as in ‡ation targeting or some simple rule (see, for instance, Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen [3] and Blinder [5] ). The existing literature 1 We put price stability in quotation marks; when central bankers refer to price stability they may mean low or zero in ‡ation, which implicitly or explicitly allows base drift of the price level. In this case, the price level has a unit root and would probably not be considered as "stable", outside central banking circles.
o¤ers only limited help in analyzing such claims, however, since its focus has primarily been on analyzing the level of the steady-state in ‡ation bias or on the transition between high and low in ‡ation. This paper focuses on the role of credibility, transparency, and reputation in the context of a stationary, low-in ‡ation equilibrium. The model of Cukierman and Meltzer [14] (CM) is an excellent starting point for this work. It is the simplest model we know of in which credibility and transparency can be clearly de…ned and in which the credibility and reputation have rich dynamics around a low-in ‡ation steady-state.
While the CM model has great potential, and deserves far more attention than it has received, it has drawbacks that we attempt to address. First, the central-bank loss function is objectionable, since it can be interpreted as being linear in output: the central bank would accept arbitrary increases in employment variance for tiny reductions in in ‡ation. This led CM to the strongly counterfactual prediction that central banks will ignore their own reputations in setting policy. Second, the e¤ects of transparency in CM are inextricably linked with control-error variance-unavoidable error in implementing policy decisions-so that improving transparency also means improving monetary control. We seek to capture aspects of certain real world e¤orts to improve transparency, such as the issuance of in ‡ation reports, which may increase transparency without directly altering the degree of monetary control. Thus, the notion of transparency we focus on is the ease with which the private sector can deduce the central bank's intentions, at unchanged degree of control.
Solving the CM model under a more standard loss function, we note that the central bank cares about its reputation and …nd a number of important results. For example, even in lowin ‡ation steady-state equilibria, transparency and reputation have a modest but important role to play. Furthermore, we …nd that reputation dynamics can mitigate or eliminate the timeconsistency problem for patient banks with very persistent goals. Increased transparency is generally good for society (though not for all parameter values), but we identify a potential con ‡ict between society and the central bank regarding transparency. For a possibly relevant range of parameters the general public wants full transparency and the central bank wants minimal transparency.
Section 2 speci…es the main building blocks and the basic features of our model. Section 3 presents solutions for several di¤erent policy regimes. Section 4 compares and contrasts the regimes; sections 5 and 6 focus in detail on the roles of credibility and transparency, respectively. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. The appendices contain technical details.
Building blocks 2.1 The model
The model only di¤ers formally from the CM model in the period loss function and in the speci…cation of the central bank's in ‡ation control error. The model has two agents, the private sector (also called the public) and the central bank. Private-sector behavior is summarized by a standard Phillips curve,
where l t is (log) employment in period t, and ¼ t is the in ‡ation rate in period t (the change in the log price level between period t ¡ 1 and t) and " t is an employment shock (a supply shock). The average rate of employment, E [l t ], is normalized to equal zero. Private-sector in ‡ation expectations are rational:
where E p denotes the rational expectation with respect to private-sector information. Throughout, the rational expectation with respect to central-bank information is denoted by E. Subscripts like tjt¡1 always indicate the conditional expectation for period t based on the public's information at the end of period t ¡ 1.
The central bank has imperfect control over in ‡ation,
where i t is the central bank's intention for in ‡ation, and´t is a mean-zero control error. Since we will generally assume that i t is not observed by the public, we emphasize that i t is the bank's intended policy outcome and not its instrument. In a simple way, this captures the fact that observable outcomes do not ‡awlessly reveal central-bank intentions. The control error satis…eś
where » t and º t are independent mean-zero normal shocks. The private sector observes » t at the end of period t, whereas the component º t remains unobservable.
The central bank's loss function at the end of period t ¡ 1 is
where¯(0 <¯< 1) is a discount factor and the period t loss function is
The central bank's total employment target, l ¤ t ; ful…lls
where l ¤¸0 is the long-run employment target, z t is a time-varying preference parameter that we call the employment target, 0 · ½ < 1, and µ t is a shock to the target.
These preferences can be interpreted as representing a central bank with an explicit zero in‡ation target, and an implicit, unobservable, and time-varying employment target. We interpret the stochastic portion of the loss function as arising from shifts in the way the central-banking structure aggregates heterogeneous societal preferences over in ‡ation and employment. 2 Thus, the central bank's taste for in ‡ation surprises may ‡uctuate due to an altered composition of the policymaking board, shifting political fortunes, or other economic factors that might have uncertain e¤ects on the central bank's taste for employment. 3 Since it is commonly assumed that central banks have preferences that are in some way unrepresentative of the public, 4 we follow Lewis [29] in considering what we stipulate to be a more representative social loss function. This function is of the form (2.4) but with the period loss given by
which simply removes z t from the central-bank loss. This re ‡ects the view that the private sector appoints a central banker that it agrees with on average, but the central banker's preferences have an idiosyncratic component not shared by the public. 5 While we examine several regimes, the central bank has full information about its preferences in all regimes and, at the end of period t, it has full information about all period t shocks. The time line in each period is as follows. At the end of period t¡1; the public forms its expectations of period t variables. The central bank observes those expectations. 6 At the beginning of period 2 It might seem natural that l ¤ t is …xed but that the relative weights on the in ‡ation and employment terms vary stochastically. Under this formulation, however, the solution to the problem is not a linear decision rule. 3 For example, in 1998 the public were clearly uncertain about how the Fed's relative taste for employment versus in ‡ation had shifted due to the crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil. 4 See, for instance, Rogo¤ [35] , Walsh [41] and [42] , Persson and Tabellini [34] and Svensson [40] . 5 The interpretation of loss functions in models of monetary policy is always complicated. There are standard justi…cations of (2.5) as a true social loss function. More in line with our preferred interpretation, one can arrive at both (2.5) and (2.8) as di¤erent aggregations of heterogeneous individual losses with (2.8) involving more representative weights. We prefer to interpret the loss functions less literally as approximations intended to capture some broad features of the problem. 6 Under our assumption that the private sector has no private information, the central bank can always construct those expectations. In the real world, central banks extract private-sector expectations from a number of di¤erent sources, such as surveys and prices of …nancial instruments (see the survey in Söderlind and Svensson [37] ). t, the central bank observes its employment target, z t , and the supply shock, " t ; and chooses its intention, i t . Next, the control error,´t, is realized, giving ¼ t ; and the public observes " t , giving l t . Then the cycle begins again. All shocks in the model are normal, mutually uncorrelated, and have zero mean and …xed variance. The variance of any particular shock v is denoted ¾ 2 v .
Reputation, credibility, and transparency
One of the bene…ts of this framework is that it allows fairly natural de…nitions of the key notions of credibility, reputation, and transparency. In equilibrium, we will show that z tjt¡1 -the public's best guess as to the bank's employment target-summarizes everything the public has learned about central-bank preferences from economic outcomes. Thus, z tjt¡1 summarizes the bank's reputation in period t.
As Blinder [4] emphasizes, there is no unanimously agreed-upon de…nition of credibility in the literature. Blinder's favorite de…nition, with which we agree, is that deeds are expected to match words. In the present context, it is natural to assume that the central bank in each period t ¡ 1 announces a zero in ‡ation target for period t. There are two reasons for this. First, as noted above, the central-bank loss function might be interpreted as being consistent with a zero in ‡ation target. Second, as we show below, the socially optimal policy implies zero expected in ‡ation. Thus, we measure credibility of the zero-in ‡ation announcement in period t ¡ 1 by the negative of the absolute value of the deviation of in ‡ation expectations from zero,
This de…nition is called the "average credibility of announcements" by Cukierman and Meltzer [13] and Cukierman [11] ; the further in ‡ation expectations are from zero, the lower is credibility. 7 Transparency is connected to how easily the public can deduce central-bank goals and intentions from observables. In this model, the central bank's goals and intentions are private information, and the unobservable portion of the in ‡ation control error, º t , prevents the public from being able to perfectly infer this information. For a given level of control error variance, the higher is the variance of º t ; the more di¢cult will it be for the public to discern central-bank intentions and, hence, the lower is transparency. Remembering that´t = » t + º t , we set
, p. 1108) gives a second, di¤erent de…nition of credibility as minus the absolute di¤erence between the banks intention and the public's perception of it: ¡¯it ¡ i tjt¡1¯. We prefer the …rst de…nition, since standard usage of the term seems, in principle, to allow that a bank could credibly announce a policy it did not intend to follow. CM's second de…nition disallows this.
and let ¿ (0 · ¿ · 1) denote (the degree of) transparency. Thus, transparency is identi…ed with the share of the control-error variance arising from the observed component: ¿ = 1 gives "full transparency of intention," under which the public perfectly infers the bank's intention each period; ¿ = 0 gives minimum transparency. 8 9 One 
Three regimes
We study three monetary policy regimes, which di¤er in the degree of transparency, but have a lack of a commitment technology in common, so that the central bank minimizes its loss function (2.4) under discretion. These are:
U Unobservable goal and intention: In this regime, 0 · ¿ < 1, and z t and i t are not observed by the private sector. In period t, the private sector observes only ¼ t , l t , » t and " t .
OI Observable intention: This is regime U but with ¿ = 1, full transparency of intention. The private sector does not observe z t directly, but it observes ¼ t ; l t , " t , and´t, from which it can deduce i t and, in equilibrium, z t ; without error.
OG Observable goal and intention: "Extreme" transparency. In period t, the private sector directly observes z t ; ¼ t ;´t, " t , and l t .
Regime U is our baseline case. Regime OI is the limit of regime U when transparency of intention reaches its maximum. We show that the public can infer the bank's goal perfectly in regime OI, but the equilibrium is remarkably di¤erent from the equilibrium in regime OG, where the goal is directly observed rather than perfectly inferred. 8 Stein [38] analyzes a di¤erent sense of transparency that may also be important. Stein derives equilibria where the central bank makes announcements about its private information that are a deterministic function of information, but the function is not invertible. Thus, the announcements do not reveal all information. This interesting work builds on Crawford and Sobel's [10] more general work on costless signalling. Unfortunately, those results are static and extending them to the context of dynamic, repeated games-which we think is the appropriate context for monetary policymaking-is well beyond the scope of this paper. We discuss this issue more extensively in [16] . Palmqvist [32] incorporates excplicit signalling in a simpli…ed variant of our model. 9 In [16] ,we show that this formulation is equivalent to one where the entire control error,´t, is not observed but the central bank makes a noisy announcement about´t at the end of period t in the form of a variable that has a squared correlation of ¿ with´t.
As a basis of comparison, we consider regime S (the social optimum) where the central bank is forced to commit to a policy rule that minimizes the social loss function, (2.4) with (2.8).
This results in the standard commitment solution,
The policy optimally smooths the e¤ect of the supply shock between in ‡ation and employment, and disregards z t , which does not enter the social loss function. 10 
Generic economic dynamics for all regimes
The analysis of these regimes is greatly simpli…ed by the fact that in our model, the dynamics of the economy, up to the parameters of the central-bank policy rule, are the same in each regime.
In all regimes, we assume that the private sector believes that the central bank's policy follows 12) for some coe¢cients k 0 , ..., k 3 . 11 We con…rm in section 3 that, if the private sector believes the policy is given by (2.12), the central bank will optimally behave according to (2.12) . This assumption has the e¤ect of making a simple linear learning scheme optimal for the private sector and, in particular, rules out signalling equilibria where small changes in policy can signal sharp di¤erences in central-bank preferences.
Given the private sector's belief in (2.12), expected in ‡ation is given by
and employment evolves according to
These expressions will hold notwithstanding if the private sector's beliefs about policy are rational. Thus, in a rational-expectations equilibrium, the central bank behaves according to (2.12), 1 0 It is relevant to ask why the other regimes are of interest when the optimal rule (2.11) could be imposed. We believe that, in the real world, policy under discretion arises because the complexity of the economic and political environment make codi…cation, adoption, and veri…cation of a good policy rule di¢cult. In any formal model that can be solved, a forcing rule may seem the obvious answer. Nevertheless, we believe that studying discretion and transparency in a tractable model may yield important lessons. 1 1 None of our results change if we extend (2.12) to include k4zt¡1 so that policy can depend separately on µt. For all the cases considered, optimality implies k4 = 0: and equilibrium dynamics are,
The only endogenous variable not determined here is the key to the analysis: reputation, z tjt¡1 .
The next section completes the derivation of the rational-expectations equilibria for the various regimes.
3 Solving the model
Regime U: unobservable goals and intentions
We solve the model by noting that the Kalman …lter provides the optimal solution to the public learning problem and by casting the central-bank optimization as a dynamic programming problem. For the CM model our approach naturally gives the same solution that CM …nd by more direct means. Their direct approach is intractable under our standard loss function.
We …rst derive the public's learning rule about z t , and then the optimal ks in the policy function. Since the public does not directly observe z t or i t directly, it forms its expectation of in ‡ation for period t at the end of period t ¡ 1 based only on the history of ¼ t , l t and » t . At the end of period t, the public can construct the variable
where we have used (2.3). Under the public's assumption that policy is made according to (2.12), we have
Furthermore, under (2.12), x t contains all the new private-sector information about z t that arrives in period t: 
where g is the Kalman gain and can be expressed in terms of k 2 and the exogenous parameters only. 13 Equation (3.4) makes it clear that reputation is a …rst order autoregressive process with the same persistence, ½, as z t . 14 Under the private sector's belief (2.12), ¼ t , l t , z t and z tjt¡1 evolve as in (2.2), (2.14), (2.7), and (3.3), respectively. There are two state variables in this economy, and for our purposes, it is natural to take the employment target, z t ; and reputation, z t+1jt as state variables. We recursively de…ne the central bank's (steady-state) value function as
where E t¡ denotes the expectation of the central bank given its information at the beginning of period t, after it has observed " t and µ t ; but before´t, ¼ t , and l t have been realized. Because the loss function is quadratic and the two state variables evolve linearly (according to (2.7) and (3.3)), the value function is quadratic,
where the coe¢cients ± 0 , ..., ± 5 remain to be determined.
In period t, the central bank solves
The …rst-order condition with respect to i t is
where the derivative @z t+1jt @it enters because current policy a¤ects future reputation through (3.1) and (3.3). The expectations and the partial derivative in this expression can be evaluated using 1 2 That is, when the forecast error variance has converged. See appendix A. 1 3 Two credibility de…nitions by CM were discussed above. CM [14] also take (½ ¡ gk2) as a measure of credibility. While this term is important in the dynamics of reputation, and, hence, credibility, it does not seem to be a natural de…nition of credibility. 1 4 Note that the second term in (3.4) is not serially correlated and is uncorrelated with z tjt¡1 and its history.
expressions already shown, and the resulting expression can be solved for i t , obtaining a policy rule of the form (2.12) with coe¢cients that ful…ll (see appendix B)
In appendix B, we prove that there is a solution to these equations and provide numerical evidence in favor of the uniqueness of the solution. 15 We solve the model for all regimes before discussing the economic interpretation, but it is useful to give some intuition for one central property driving results in each of the regimes.
When l ¤ > 0, the bank, on average, has some incentive to use positive in ‡ation surprises to increase employment. In equilibrium, one factor that prevents this is what we will call the reputation cost. Take a bank with l ¤ t > 0 and suppose, for simplicity, that its reputation at t truly re ‡ects its preferences: z t = z tjt¡1 . If the bank considers a marginal increase in i t above the equilibrium value, it will …nd bene…ts in terms of higher employment at t. Increasing i t increases employment through the Phillips curve by pushing in ‡ation higher than expected (as in (2.14)). The reputation cost is due to the fact that this in ‡ation surprise at t will increase z t+1jt (through (3.3)). The marginal e¤ect is given by @E t¡ z t+1jt =@i t = g. The larger is the Kalman gain in the learning problem, the greater is the sensitivity of the bank's reputation to its action.
We can see how the reputation a¤ect …gures in the bank's decision by re-writing the …rst-order condition, (3.8), as
This equation reveals that the bank trades o¤ the future reputation cost of an in ‡ation surprise on the righthand side of the equation against the current net bene…ts on the lefthand side.
Key results below for each regime are driven by how various factors a¤ect the magnitude of the reputation cost of in ‡ation. We now summarize the solution for regimes OI (observable instrument) and OG (observable goal).
Regimes OI and OG
The solution in regime OI, observable instrument, is obtained from that of regime U by assuming full transparency of intentions (¿ = 1). Thus, the ks follow by letting ¾ 2 º go to zero in the expressions for the baseline regime, (3.9)-(3.12) and (B.9)-(B.13). Taking the relevant limits gives the policy rule coe¢cients for regime OI,
where we have used that gk 2 = ½ when ¾ 2 º = 0 (see appendix C). In regime OG, we allow the private sector to observe z t directly in period t. Thus, z tjt¡11 z t¡1 independent of the policy rule. The value function (3.5) from the baseline regime is still appropriate. In ‡ation expectations, ¼ tjt¡1 , are given by (2.16) after substituting for z tjt¡1 ,
Since @z t+1jt @it´0 , the …rst-order condition with respect to i t , (3.8) , is now
which, with (3.17), implies
Thus, the rule for regime OG is,
Numerical analysis of the model
Because we do not have a closed form solution for regime U, we follow CM by studying a number of properties of the model numerically. We summarize the numerical approach here; for details, see appendices B and D. Judd [24] further explains and justi…es this type of numerical analysis of models.
We study the properties of the model on a large parameter space comprised by (¯; ½; ¿ ) 2
Speci…cally, we solve the model for 100,000 points drawn uniformly from this parameter space. 16 Once the model is solved for a particular draw, we tally which among a large number of claims hold true for that parameter value, e.g.: Is centralbank loss in regime U lower than in OI? Is the derivative of the central-bank loss with respect to transparency positive?
Once all 100,000 draws are tallied, we can state the share of draws for which each claim holds true. If a property holds for some parameter values and not for others, the solutions for the particular parameter values constitute a constructive proof that the result is indeterminate.
If a property holds for all 100,000 points, we do not have proof that the property holds for all values, but we can make a very strong statement. If a claim holds for each of N draws, the probability that the claim is false on a fraction of the parameter space of at least size ! is less than or equal to (1 ¡ !) N . Thus, with 100,000 draws, the probability that the claim is false for at least 0.01 percent of the parameter space is less than 0.005 percent. 17 In what follows, we …rst compare and contrast the di¤erent regimes and then turn to the details of credibility and transparency in case U.
Comparing the regimes
Several important properties of equilibria under the various regimes are summarized in table 4.1.
As in all Barro-Gordon-type models, the central bank has an incentive to use in ‡ation surprises to stimulate employment. In equilibrium, average in ‡ation expectations must be high enough so that the marginal employment bene…t of a surprise is o¤set by the marginal in ‡ation cost.
In all regimes, the average in ‡ation bias (k 0 ) is bounded by l ¤ , the average wedge between the central bank's long-run employment target and equilibrium employment.
In all regimes, the response to a supply shock is the same, k 1 = ¡1=2. In all regimes but U, the public learns z t at the end of t so that the variance of the private-sector forecast of z t+1 is at the minimum possible value of ¾ 2 µ . Despite the fact that the public knows all there is to know about z t at the end of period t in regimes OI, OG, and S, the outcomes for the average in ‡ation bias span the range from zero in S to the upper bound of l ¤ in OG. This section explores 
Note: P denotes the variance of the forecast error, Note: l ¤ = 1;¯= 0:95; ½ = 0:7 and
why these and some other important features come from the model. It begins with a numerical example, allowing us to get some notion of the economic magnitudes involved.
A numerical example
One of the central questions raised in the introduction is whether issues like credibility and transparency should continue to receive any signi…cant attention in an economy that has solved the average in ‡ation bias problem and attained a low-in ‡ation steady-state. While this model is not su¢ciently rich to calibrate to some real economy and make de…nite quantitative statements, some broad conclusions can be drawn. is l ¤ = 1 and the employment target is quite persistent (½ = 0:7) but with a modest variance of 1.4 (= ¾ 2 " =(1 ¡ ½ 2 )). In regime U, we set transparency to a minimum (¿ = 0) in order to demonstrate the maximum contrast from regime OI (¿ = 1).
From both the central bank and social perspectives, regime OG is the worst. The central bank ranks the other regimes from the best to the worst as U, OI, S; the societal ranking is exactly the opposite. We explore these relative rankings below; here, we emphasize that the di¤erences among regimes are potentially of economic importance. For example, with these parameter values the variance of l t at the social optimum is 1.25 and this optimum is nearly attained in regime OI. This employment gap variance is about 20 percent higher in regimes U and OG. Furthermore, the results imply that in ‡ation will be 3 percentage points above the optimum in ‡ation more than 10 percent of the time in regime OG, but less than 1 percent of the time in regime OI.
Thus, even though each of these regimes constitutes a low-in ‡ation steady-state-in ‡ation is almost never above 5 percent in any of the regimes-reputation, credibility, and transparency remain potentially important determinants of economic outcomes. We now turn to the reason for this.
A patient bank with very persistent goals is socially optimal
As the bank becomes more patient and the goal becomes more persistent, the central bank moves toward the social optimum in the limit: Proposition 4.1. In regimes U and OI, in the limit as¯½ ! 1; the coe¢cients of the policy rule converge to those of regime S, the social optimum:
For regime OI, this limit is easy to see in (3.14)-(3.16); for regime U, see appendix B. This result is driven by the reputation cost of surprise in ‡ation to the central bank. As noted above, a marginal unexpected increase in intended in ‡ation at t leads to a positive in ‡ation surprise worsening the banks reputation, which raises expected loss from t + 1 onward. The e¤ect of raising ½ and¯is to make this reputation cost prohibitive. As noted in (3.4), z tjt¡1 is as persistent as z t . As ½ approaches one, any change in reputation due to an in ‡ation surprise approaches permanence. With¯close to one, the future costs of this nearly permanent loss of reputation weigh heavily on current decisions by the bank. By setting k 2 = 0, the bank guarantees that the private sector will not attribute any in ‡ation surprise to an increase in the employment target and insulates the bank from any reputation cost. In short, the potential reputation costs are so large that the bank completely ignores its idiosyncratic goals. If one believes, as we do, that central bank goals evolve slowly, this result provides an alternative to Rogo¤'s [35] "weight-conservative" central banker as a solution to time-consistency problems (see also Svensson [40] ).
Regime OG: Should the public observe the goal directly or infer it from actions?
The reputation costs that drive the limiting result are absent in the observed goal regime, which makes OG the worst of all regimes. As noted above, the average in ‡ation bias is the largest of all regimes (table 4.1); more generally, using the numerical method described above, we …nd Proposition 4.2. When the central bank's idiosyncratic goals are directly observed by the public (regime OG), average in ‡ation, social loss, and central bank loss are each higher than under any level of transparency of intention with unobserved goal (regimes U and OI).
The intuition for this is clear. In the OG regime, the public directly observes the bank's employment target and thus z tjt¡1´½ z t¡1 independent of the bank's behavior. Thus, @z t+1jt =@i t0
; there is no longer a reputation cost of in ‡ation. No matter what the level of transparency in regime U, the constraining e¤ect of reputation leads to a better outcome than in regime OG.
At …rst, it may seem puzzling that OG is also worse than OI, since z t is perfectly known at the end of t in both these regimes. The important di¤erence is that z t is inferred from i t in OI, whereas it is directly observed in OG. Since the perfect inference regarding z t only occurs in equilibrium in OI, if the central bank were to implement higher-than-equilibrium in ‡ation, its reputation would su¤er. This cost of o¤-equilibrium-path behavior constrains the bank.
Thus, it matters how transparency is implemented: "extreme" transparency, in the sense that the public is no longer learning about the central bank's future intentions from current actions, is worse than no transparency at all. 18 
Response to the supply shock
As noted above, the central bank in all regimes responds to the supply shock by optimally spreading the e¤ect between output and in ‡ation: k 1 = ¡1=2 (see table 4.1). Thus, the marginal e¤ect on intended in ‡ation of an increase in the supply shock is ¡1/2 independent of regime and independent of the level of the goal, z t , and of the level of credibility, c t . This is contrary to the often stated intuition (Bernanke and Mishkin [7] , Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City [17] ) that greater transparency and/or credibility increase the bank's ‡exibility in responding to supply shocks. Similarly, banks do not build up credibility to spend it (disproportionately) when the employment target is highest. These results will generally follow in any linear-quadratic model where the supply shock a¤ects in ‡ation and output linearly. These results should form an important baseline: con ‡icting results must rest on important nonlinearities.
If the supply shock were unobservable, the response coe¢cient k 1 would depend on the regime and the transparency. Still, with a linear reaction function, the response to supply shocks would remain independent of reputation and credibility.
Optimal acquisition of credibility in regime U
In all our regimes except U, the public knows the central bank's goals precisely in equilibrium and the bank does not face the commonly discussed problem of wanting low in ‡ation, but having the public skeptical about that desire. The question of what a bank should do in this situation has, of course, been widely discussed. For example, it is sometimes claimed that a central bank with low credibility should follow a more restrictive policy than a fully credible bank in order to regain credibility. 19 To explore this question, we compare two realizations of the economy, starting at the beginning of period t with the same value of the state variable z t¡1 , but in one case credibility is low (`) and in the other it is high (h), ct ¡1 < c h t¡1 . Credibility alone does not tell the sign of in ‡a-tion expectations; we restrict the discussion of a low and a high credibility bank to situations of positive (that is, too high) in ‡ation expectations: ¼t jt¡1 > ¼ h tjt¡1¸0 . By (2.13), the two banks' reputations will then ful…ll zt jt¡1 > z h tjt¡1 . For any variable v t , de…ne ¢v t´vt ¡ v h t , that is, the low-credibility value minus the high-credibility value. We thus have ¢¼ tjt¡1 > 0; ¢z tjt¡1 > 0:
(5.1) Proposition 5.1. In regime U, ceteris paribus: (i) The low-credibility bank optimally implements higher in ‡ation than the high-credibility bank, ¢¼ t > 0.
(ii) The low-credibility bank optimally implements lower in ‡ation relative to private-sector expectations ¢(¼ t ¡ ¼ tjt¡1 ) < 0. This larger negative in ‡ation surprise leads to lower employment in the low-credibility economy, ¢l t < 0.
Part (i) and (ii) follow directly from (2.15), (2.13), (2.18) and (5.1), since
and k 3 < k 2 + k 3 . The low-credibility bank accommodates part of, but only part of, its higher in ‡ation expectations, resulting in higher in ‡ation. The negative in ‡ation surprise is larger in absolute terms under low credibility, leading to lower employment,
The low-credibility bank would, of course, gain reputation and credibility faster if it accommodated less of the in ‡ation expectation, but this is not optimal due to the current employment cost. The cost of the negative in ‡ation surprise is the opposite of the bene…ts of a positive surprise discussed above: lowering i t leads to bene…ts in terms of lower in ‡ation and better future reputation, but lowers employment through the Phillips curve. The optimal policy is a compromise between these concerns. This result is one formalization of results from the "gradualist versus cold turkey" debate regarding lowering in ‡ation in the early 1980s. 20 While the optimal speed of adjustment will vary depending on the model, the result that will generalize quite broadly is that with low credibility, the bank should allow higher in ‡ation, but will generate greater negative in ‡ation surprises, than with high credibility. 21 Given this result, evidence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations above some long-run target does not necessarily suggest that a bank is insu¢ciently attentive to the target; rather, the bank may be optimally responding to low credibility. Only the fact that the low-credibility bank is implementing smaller absolute in ‡ation surprises would be evidence that it is behaving suboptimally.
The e¤ects of transparency in regime U
In this section, we study the role of transparency in regime U. We report results on "welfare" under various transparency levels as measured by the unconditional expectation of the relevant loss function. Thus, we learn which regime is best on average, or which would be preferred without knowledge of the state variables. The social unconditional loss is proportional to E[L p t ] with L p t given by (2.8), which can be written as
The central bank's unconditional loss is proportional to E[L t ], with L t as in (2.5), which can be written as a sum of six terms:
2)
The central-bank loss di¤ers from the social loss by the term
, where only the covariance term is endogenous. The intuition for this is that the central-bank optimum di¤ers from the private-sector optimum only to the extent that the central bank can generate movements in employment that follow the target z t . The central bank can only achieve this by using in ‡ation surprises.
Increasing transparency in case U
The results are summarized in, Proposition 6.1. Consider increasing transparency, ¿; in regime U.
(i) Reputation. Raising ¿ raises the variance of reputation, but decreases the variance of reputation errors (z t ¡ z tjt¡1 ). Raising ¿ raises the expected reputation cost to the bank of raising intended in ‡ation (increases @E t¡ z t+1jt =@i t ).
(ii) In ‡ation. Raising ¿ lowers average in ‡ation (strictly whenever l ¤ > 0), but may raise or reduce the variance of in ‡ation and the in ‡ation term in the unconditional loss, E[¼ If raising ¿ deserves the interpretation as increasing transparency, the variance of reputational errors should fall. This is indeed the case; reducing the variance of the unobservable portion of the control error makes the central bank's reputation track its actual preferences more closely (thus, reduces Var[z t ¡ z tjt¡1 ]´P ). 22 Given the smaller unobservable control-error variance, the public assumes that a greater share of any in ‡ation surprise is due to intentional action by the bank, and the sensitivity of the bank's reputation to its intention rises: @z t+1jt =@i t = g increases. This raises the reputation cost of in ‡ation to the bank, which drives the remaining results.
In particular, the greater reputation cost leads to a decrease in k 0 ; k 2 ; and k 3 . 23 Consider why k 0 , average in ‡ation, falls. In any Barro-Gordon-type model, in ‡ation must be high enough, on average, to keep the central bank from engineering positive in ‡ation surprises on average.
The rise in transparency increases the marginal reputation cost of in ‡ation and thereby reduces the average level of in ‡ation required to keep the bank from using in ‡ation surprises. 2 2 If we held k 2 constant, this result could be demonstrated analytically. In principle, the central bank could reduce k2 in response to increased transparency to the extent that its private goal would be harder to detect. This does not happen in equilibrium. 2 3 Of course, k1 = ¡1=2 remains optimal in all regimes. We call the fall in k 2 and k 3 a reduction in "activism" by the bank. The argument why k 2 + k 3 falls when transparency rises is very similar to the argument for k 0 . While k 0 gives the unconditional in ‡ation bias, k 0 + (k 2 + k 3 )z tjt¡1 gives the conditional in ‡ation bias for t seen from t ¡ 1. The conditional in ‡ation bias falls for each level of z tjt¡1 ; for the same reason as the unconditional one falls: the marginal reputation cost to the bank of in ‡ation has risen at each level of z tjt¡1 . 24 Most of the remaining results in the proposition follow from the how the reduction in k 0 , k 2 , and k 3 a¤ect key components in the model listed in table 6.1 (we emphasize the row for the "full" parameter space at this point). As for part (i), we have explained the reduction in the variance of reputation errors. This also accounts for the increased variance of reputation as the predictor better tracks the predicted.
Part (ii), in ‡ation. The fall in average in ‡ation, k 0 , was discussed above. One paradoxical result is that the unconditional variance of in ‡ation may rise. From (2.15), this variance is 25
The contribution to in ‡ation variance of the control error and supply shock (the …nal two terms) are unchanged. The …rst term-the contribution of the employment target variance-falls with ) rises for only 6:9(= 100 ¡ 93:1) percent of the parameter space, as the fall in k 2 0 o¤sets the rise in in ‡ation variance. 26 2 4 The argument why k 2 and k 3 fall separately is more complicated, but seems to involve the same elements. 2 5 Noting that
Part (iii), employment. The variance of employment clearly falls as the variance of in ‡ation surprises falls. This unambiguously lowers the employment term in the social loss function.
In contrast, the rise in transparency unambiguously raises the employment term in the
The fall in employment variance is due to the fact that, with greater transparency, the bank chooses to generate smaller in ‡ation surprises. These surprises were, of course, used to make employment move with the target l ¤ t , and the bank is made worse o¤ without this co-movement. 27 Part (iv), loss. Given the results for the components of the loss functions, it is natural that both the central bank and social loss can either rise or fall with transparency. Social loss generally falls (96.3 percent of the parameter space) with increased transparency, however.
Further, for plausible discount rates (¯> 1=2), greater transparency is uniformly socially good. which reduces the variance of employment. While this is good for the public, the reduction in employment variance is due to the component that was correlated with the bank's target, making the bank worse o¤. 2 7 More formally, we have
The second and third terms on the right side do not change. The …rst term falls. It is, however, the component of lt that covaries with zt that is diminished in variance; thus, the fall in the covariance between lt and zt more than o¤sets the fall in variance of l t :
where we have used Cov[lt; zt] = k2P . The left side rises, since P falls and since k 2 2 ¡ 2k2 < 0 falls in magnitude.
Optimal transparency
Since loss does not change monotonically for all levels of ¿ , proposition 6.1 leaves open the question of which degree of transparency minimizes loss. This question is resolved in, Proposition 6.2. For the "full" parameter space (the top row in table 6.1): (i) Full transparency of intention minimizes the social loss for 97:3 percent of the parameter space. The social loss is always minimized at either ¿ = 1 or ¿ = 0.
(ii) Full transparency of intention minimizes the central-bank loss for 79:5 percent of the parameter space, whereas minimum transparency minimizes it for 18:6 percent. An intermediate degree of transparency is best for central-bank loss for 1:9 percent.
(iii) The optimal transparency is always at least as high for society as for the central bank. For 15:9 percent of the parameter space, ¿ = 0 minimizes central-bank loss while ¿ = 1 minimizes social loss.
This proposition is shown numerically. Full transparency of intention is generally best for society. For most of the full parameter space, it is best for the central bank as well. Throughout the full parameter space, the optimal degree of transparency is at least as high for society as for the central bank.
However, social and central-bank preferences sharply con ‡ict on a strikingly large portion of the parameter space (15.8 percent): the bank wants minimum transparency and the public wants full transparency. We can shed further light on this phenomenon by considering the "small" parameter space which di¤ers from the full space only by imposing that the bank is patient (¯= 0:99999) and has no average bias (l ¤ = 0). This corresponds to the second row of This result is clear from table 6.1. 28 The public likes transparency for the same reason as in the full parameter space. The central bank's increased preference for minimum transparency in the small parameter space is related to the roles of both l ¤ and¯. With l ¤ > 0 there is an average in ‡ation bias, and one bene…t to the bank of lower transparency is a reduced average bias. With l ¤ = 0 this bene…t is gone. The primary cost to the bank of increasing transparency is a more limited ability to generate a correlation between employment and z t . When a shock drives z t up, z t remains high and since the public learns slowly, the bank can increase l t for several periods.
Greater patience (¯near one), raises the bene…t from persistent increases employment in such periods. Higher transparency would increase the speed of learning and reduce the persistence of the increase in employment. Thus, a patient bank with no average bias prefers the minimum possible transparency. 29 These results suggest a possible con ‡ict between society and the central bank over transparency. Perhaps paradoxically, this con ‡ict may be smaller in cases of high average in ‡ation bias (high l ¤ ): societies with large average bias problems may …nd it easier to adopt transparency than those with small average bias problems.
We emphasize that these results and those of CM preceding them, raise a host of complicated issues. Since we consider a central bank choosing the optimal ¿ once-and-for-all, we implicitly assume that the central bank has a commitment technology regarding transparency, but not with regard to the policy rule itself. While CM make a similar assumption, we believe the discretion case might also be of interest. Commitment might arise if we view the public as choosing ¿ and imposing it on the central bank, but then we must consider Lewis's [29] argument that the central bank could o¤set increased transparency by increasing the variance of the control error.
This suggests a game between the central bank and those regulating it. Our related paper, [16] , deals with these issues.
Conclusions
In this paper, we follow Cukierman and Meltzer in examining the importance of transparency and credibility in monetary policy by using a model where the central bank's employment target is stochastic and time-varying. We believe that our work improves on their seminal work by acknowledging an explicit stabilization objective for employment or output and by distinguishing transparency from control-error variance. The former makes central-bank policy depend on its reputation; the latter we believe to be necessary for avoiding confusion between transparency and control in monetary policy. Thus, increased transparency means that the private-sector can more easily infer the central bank's intentions, at given degrees of monetary control.
The model has implications for some frequent claims in the literature. One of these claims is that a low-credibility bank, everything else equal, should conduct a less expansionary policy than a high-credibility bank. We …nd that a low-credibility bank-one facing higher in ‡ation expectations-will generate a larger (negative) in ‡ation surprise from the public's perspective, leading to lower employment and, in this sense, conducts a less expansionary policy. However, the low-credibility bank at the same time generates higher in ‡ation than a high-credibility bank and, in this sense, conducts a more expansionary policy. Thus, it cannot be inferred from higher in ‡ation alone that a bank is not optimally pursuing an in ‡ation target.
A second claim is that a low-credibility bank has less ‡exibility to respond to shocks in order to avoid further erosion of credibility. In contrast, we …nd that low and high-credibility banks react in the same way to supply shocks and shocks to the employment target; it is not the case that the low-credibility bank has less scope to stabilize supply shocks, nor does it more urgently build up credibility than a high-credibility bank.
A third claim is that increased transparency increases credibility and improves policy outcomes. In our model, increased transparency makes the central bank's reputation and privatesector in ‡ation expectations more sensitive to the central bank's actions. This increases the costs for the bank of deviating from the announced zero-in ‡ation policy, and hence deters the bank from using in ‡ation surprises to achieve its employment target. As a result, variability of both in ‡ation and employment falls, and any average in ‡ation bias is reduced. These changes generally (but not always) increase social welfare. In many cases, however, increased transparency leads to a worse outcome for the bank. Since the central bank's preferences and social preferences for transparency diverge, society might prefer to decide on the level of transparency in monetary policy, rather than delegate this decision to the central bank. 30 The fact that increased transparency makes the bank's optimal policy closer to the social optimum may throw some light on McCallum's [31] criticism of discretion equilibria in monetary policy. McCallum argues that the problems arising in discretion equilibria may not be decisive in practice because central bankers see the value of the policy consistent with commitment and can just do it. If we are to maintain the equilibrium framework, this can only be interpreted as the belief that there is some heretofore unmodelled aspect of preferences or commitment mechanisms that alters the equilibrium outcomes. 31 We sympathize with this view: some implicit commitment mechanism may exist. We would like to see this mechanism speci…ed and discussed, however, because we also sympathize with Canzoneri's [9] view that, in the presence of private information, commitment would be hard to sustain. In our model, private information exists, but the central bank's concern about its reputation creates an incentive to behave more in accordance with the socially optimal policy. Increased transparency makes this incentive stronger.
Indeed, a very patient central bank with very persistent idiosyncratic deviations from the social employment goal would, in the limit, follow the socially optimal policy. Thus, credibility and transparency may push the discretion equilibrium toward the socially preferred equilibrium, in spite of the absence of an explicit commitment mechanism. 32 With regard to transparency, we …nd an especially intriguing result. When the central bank's idiosyncratic goals can be directly observed, the central bank's preferences need not be inferred from the its actions. Since the central bank's reputation is then independent of its actions, the central bank loses an important constraint on its behavior. The resulting equilibrium has higher average in ‡ation and higher variability of both in ‡ation and employment than in any other case studied. Thus, this type of "extreme" transparency is counterproductive. In a richer model, such extreme transparency might be bene…cial if, for example, directly observing the central bank's idiosyncratic goals allowed society to force its own goals on the central bank more e¤ectively.
There are some obvious quali…cations to our results, some of which may be suitable for future work. In a separate paper, [16] , we treat the optimal transparency more thoroughly, considering the issues of commitment and the incentives of the central bank to renege. Further complicating the private sector's learning problem with confusions between supply shocks and shocks to goals as well as between temporary and persistent shocks would complicate the private sector's signal extraction problem and possibly modify some of our results. Finally, we have assumed that the private sector believes the central bank's policy rule to be linear; as a consequence, it is optimal for the central bank to choose a linear rule. While this is a natural starting point, and the existence of strong nonlinearities in learning seems implausible to us, work relaxing this assumption might create further insights.
A The Kalman …lter
Following Harvey [23] , but using our notation, we have the transition equation (2.7) and measurement equation (3.2) , which implies the updating equation (3.3) . In steady state, the Kalman gain, g, is given by
where P is the conditional variance of the optimal predictor:
If ½ and k 2 are both positive, from (A.1) it is clear that,
B Unobservable goal
Using E t¡ l t = i t ¡ ¼ tjt¡1 + " t , we can write the …rst-order condition (3.8) as
From (2.12), (3.2) and (3.3) and we have,
3)
Substituting and collecting terms gives a function of the form (2.12) with (3.9)-(3.12):
Now, return to the value function using (2.12) and (2.18),
Expansion of the value function gives:
The following expressions are useful in evaluating this expectation:
(B.7)
Thus, expanding expectations in the value function yields
Collecting the constants and rearranging using (2.10) gives,
Collect terms in z tjt¡1 and rearranging using (3.9) gives:
Collect terms in z 2 tjt¡1 :
Collect terms in z t¡1 and rearrange using (3.9):
Similarly the terms in z 2 t¡1 give:
Finally the terms in z tjt¡1 z t¡1 with (3.12) give:
; (B.13)
B.1 Existence
We now have a simultaneous set of 9 equations, 3 for the ks and 6 for the ±s (k 1 = ¡ 1 2 is known). We …rst show that we can rewrite that system as a single equation for k 2 in terms of itself,
and equations giving the eight remaining ks and ±s in terms of k 2 . First, we get an expression for k 3 in terms of k 2 only. Since g by (A.1) depends only on k 2 , and ± 2 by (B.10) depends only on k 2 and k 3 , (3.12) can be written as an expression in k 2 and k 3 only. Taking k 2 as …xed, the equation is a quadratic in k 3 :
where
This has solutions of the form,
We note that we can write A(k 2 ) as
hence 0 · A(k 2 ) < 1; (B.15) since 0 · ½¡g(k 2 )k 2 < 1. Note that if we take the positive root in (B.14), this inequality implies that 0 < k 3 < k 2 . We have two arguments for taking the positive root. First, for particular parameter values, one can rule out the negative root by showing that a one-period deviation from the implied policy rule decreases the central bank's loss. Using the approach described in Appendix D, we veri…ed numerically that the negative root is not an equilibrium. Second, McCallum [30] argues that we should consider solutions for which the coe¢cients of the policy rule are continuous in the parameters of the problem. It is straightforward to see that this argument rules out the negative root.
Thus, we have k 3 in terms of k 2 alone, and substituting this expression for k 3 into the formulae for ± 2 gives an expression for ± 2 in terms of k 2 alone. By (B.13), ± 5 depends only on k 2 . Recursive substitution using these results gives expressions for the other ±s and k 0 . Finally, substituting the expressions for ± 2 and ± 5 into (3.11) gives the desired equation for k 2 : B.2 Proof that k 2 and k 3 go to zero when¯½ goes to one First, we show that lim¯½ !1 k 2 = 0. Denote the numerator in (B.16) by N, so that
or, using g(
Now let¯½ ! 1, in which case¯! 1 and ½ ! 1 (since they are both bounded above by one), and¯½ 2 ! 1. Assume, contrary to the desired result, that k 2 is bounded away from zero as ½ 2 ! 1. Since P(k 2 ) is bounded below by ¾ 2 º , we have 1 N ! 1 implying N ! 0. Since the denominator of (B.16) is bounded below by 2, N ! 0 implies that k 2 ! 0, a contradiction. Since (as noted above) 0 · k 3 < k 2 , it follows directly that lim¯½ !1 k 3 ! 0.
C Regime OI
From (A.1) and (A.2) it is clear that gk 2 = ½ when ¾ 2 º = 0. Using this fact and (3.12), we have k 2 = k 3 . Substituting in (B.9), (B.10), and (B.13), gives ± 1 = 2l ¤ k 2 1+¯½ ; ± 2 = 2k 2 2 ; ± 5 = ½k 2 Using these results, (3.9), and gk 2 = ½,
From (3.10), k 1 = ¡ 1 2 , and from (3.11) using gk 2 = ½ and the expressions for ± 2 and ± 3 ,
These together imply the results in the text.
D The numerical analysis
For a given value of the parameters (¯; ½; ¿ ,¾ 2 ; ¾ 2 µ ; l ¤ ), we solve regime U by searching over k 2 2 [0;
1 2 ] for a k 2 satisfying k 2 = f(k 2 ). Regimes OI and OG can be solved by direct computation. After solving the models, any aspect of the models for which we have formulae can be computed directly. This includes all the results about the values of the ks, the loss functions, g, and P . In particular, the derivatives are all evaluated with analytic formulae.
Three items for which we state numerical results cannot be directly computed: (1) Uniqueness of the solution to k 2 = f (k 2 ), and (2) The incentive to deviate from the possible equilibrium with the negative k 3 root, 3) Verifying what ¿ is optimal for any value for the other parameters.
Numerical uniqueness is checked by computing f(k 2 ) for 100 evenly spaced points in the interval [0:0001; 0:5] and checking whether f is monotonically declining over the range for those points.
To test the incentive to deviate under the negative k 3 root, we …rst solve the model for the ks, ±s, and g taking the negative root for k 3 . We then repeat the following steps for a wide range of the state variables z t and z tjt¡1 (these are the state variables as of time t¡, which is relevant in what follows): (i) Evaluate the central-bank loss under the implied policy rule seen from time t¡, after µ and " = 0 are drawn at t, but before´is drawn. (ii) Evaluate the central-bank loss seen from time t¡ (with " = 0) from setting i t equal to various arbitrarily chosen values, but returning to the policy rule from t + 1 onward. If for any (z t ; z tjt¡1 ) pair, there is an i t that dominates the policy rule, we have proved that the negative k 3 root is not an equilibrium for this parameter value. In 100,000 draws, about 3 percent of the draws would not solve at all with the negative k 3 root; for all the remaining draws, the negative root does not constitute an equilibrium.
For the optimal ¿ , we draw a value for the other parameters and check the value of the two loss functions at 100 evenly spaced points between zero and one. The smallest loss is taken as the optimum.
Four separate numerical experiments were performed: There was one run for the full parameter space and one for the small parameter space where all aspects except the optimal ¿ and the validity of the negative k 3 root were checked. There was one run checking the optimal ¿ for the full parameter space (since the derivatives of loss with respect to ¿ for the small parameter space were of one sign, the optimal ¿ results follow without further computation). Finally, there was one run checking the validity of the negative k 3 root. In each case, for a small number of draws, numerical instability for certain extreme parameter values kept us from solving the model at all. For the four experiments, this problem arose for 63, 66, 152, and 3,319 draws out of 100,000, respectively.
